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Shor’s factoring algorithm (SFA), by its ability to efficiently factor large numbers, has the poten-
tial to undermine contemporary encryption. At its heart is a process called order finding, which
quantum mechanics lets us perform efficiently. SFA thus consists of a quantum order finding al-
gorithm (QOFA), bookended by classical routines which, given the order, return the factors. But,
with probability up to 1/2, these classical routines fail, and QOFA must be rerun. We modify these
routines using elementary results in number theory, improving the likelihood that they return the
factors.
The resulting quantum factoring algorithm is better than SFA at factoring safe semiprimes, an
important class of numbers used in cryptography. With just one call to QOFA, our algorithm almost
always factors safe semiprimes. As well as a speed-up, improving efficiency gives our algorithm other,
practical advantages: unlike SFA, it does not need a randomly picked input, making it simpler to
construct in the lab; and in the (unlikely) case of failure, the same circuit can be rerun, without
modification.
We consider generalizing this result to other cases, although we do not find a simple extension,
and conclude that SFA is still the best algorithm for general numbers (non safe semiprimes, in other
words). Even so, we present some simple number theoretic tricks for improving SFA in this case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shor’s factoring algorithm (SFA) [1] is a promising ap-
plication of quantum computers. Like classical factoring
algorithms, it returns a nontrivial factor of an integer
N =
∏k
i=1 p
ei
i , where the pi are primes, with pi 6= pj and
ei > 0. But, unlike its classical counterparts, SFA does
this efficiently—its runtime increases just polynomially
in the length of N , as opposed to subexponentially for
the best classical algorithms. This speed-up is due to the
quantum subroutine at the heart of SFA, the quantum
order finding algorithm (QOFA). QOFA efficiently calcu-
lates the order of an integer a modulo N : that is, given
coprime integers a and N , QOFA returns the smallest in-
teger r > 0 such that ar mod N = 1, where mod is the
modulo operator. (In practice, QOFA is only guaranteed
to return a divisor of the order.)
SFA proceeds as follows: an integer a is chosen at ran-
dom. In the unlikely event that gcd(a,N) (the greatest
common divisor of a and N) is greater than 1, then we
have already found a nontrivial factor of N . Otherwise,
we use QOFA to find the order r of a modulo N . If r is
even (which occurs with probability at least 1/2), then
a factor of N may be given by gcd(ar/2 ± 1, N). If a
factor is not found, or if r is odd, then the procedure is
relaunched with a different random value of a [1–3].
Much work has been done on the quantum part of the
algorithm [4–10]. In this letter we take a different ap-
proach: we reduce the probability of failure by applying
elementary results in number theory to the classical part
of SFA.
Our main result concerns safe semiprimes, defined here
to be the product N = p1p2 of two safe primes p1 and
p2 of the form pi = 2qi + 1, where qi is prime. Safe
primes were introduced by Sophie Germain in her study
of Fermat’s last theorem [11].
They are now called safe because of their relation to
strong primes—primes p such that p − 1 has at least a
large prime factor. The strong and safe name of these
primes comes from the hardness to factor their products
using Pollard’s “p− 1” factoring algorithm [12]. The safe
primes are the strongest of all strong prime, and are well
defined in terms of number theory. Until the discovery
of elliptic curve factorization [13], they were widely held
as being the hardest to factor for this reason. This led to
the recommendation of using the related strong primes
for RSA cryptography, that is prime such that p− 1 has
large prime factors but this recommendation is contested
[14], even if they are still recommended in the National
Institute of Standard’s FIPS 186-4 [15].
Independently of their relationship to strong
semiprimes, safe semiprimes are used in the Cramer–
Shoup signature scheme [16], where the primality of
q1 and q2 allows to reduce the cost of the signature
generation and, more importantly, to prove the security
of the scheme against an adaptive chosen message attack
under the strong RSA assumption. Both properties come
from the fact that a random hash h generates the group
of quadratic residues modulo N with overwhelming
probability.
We present an algorithm which, given one call to
QOFA, factors safe semiprimes N with probability ≈
1− 4/N . In contrast, for a single query of QOFA, SFA’s
classical routines fail to factor these numbers half the
2time.
At the core of our algorithm is the simple observation
that for these numbers, the output d of QOFA always
divides 2q1q2, and all divisors of 2q1q2, except 1 and 2,
allow to compute p1 and p2. This information, contained
in d, is not used optimally by SFA. Interestingly, the
property that makes safe semiprimes the hardest num-
bers to factor using Pollard’s classical p− 1 algorithm is
exactly that which makes them easy to factor with our
quantum algorithm. We also consider moving from the
special case of safe semiprimes to general numbers. Al-
though the proofs do not extend naturally, we find a few
tricks that may make factoring general numbers easier.
The idea of modifying the classical parts of SFA so
as to reduce the dependence on QOFA is not new, al-
though previous studies fine-tune the algorithm, rather
than re-think part of it, as we try to do. References [17–
19] discuss how best to pick a to maximize the probability
of factoring. References [2, 20] increase efficiency by ex-
tracting r from failed outputs of QOFA. These results
offer practical advantages beyond simple theoretical im-
provements: although efficient in theory, in practice each
call to QOFA needs an individual experiment, which is
time-consuming and costly in resources. Indeed, for some
architectures—photonics, for instance—each experiment
requires a new circuit.
Beyond its low failure rate, our algorithm has two ad-
vantages when factoring safe semiprimes (and possibly a
larger class of numbers). The first is that rather than
picking the value of a randomly, we can keep it constant.
In this letter we use a = 2, but other sensible choices can
be made. The second is that, when our algorithm does
fail, exactly the same circuit can be used again, unlike
SFA which needs to be reset with a different value of a.
We note that this is not the first time specific values
of a have been used in investigations of SFA. Experi-
mentalists, held back by young technology, have so far
picked values of a that let them simplify the circuit and
focus on certain interesting parts of the algorithm [4–10].
Reference [21] highlighted the danger of this approach,
arguing that the value of a should not rely on knowledge
of the factors. We emphasize that the success of our al-
gorithm does not rely on knowing the factors in advance:
our value a = 2 is obviously independent of the number
being factored.
II. NUMBER THEORETIC TOOLS
We write x | y to mean x is a divisor of y: that is,
there exists an integer z such that y = xz. A positive
integer is prime if it has no divisors other than itself
and 1. If y1, . . . , yk are integers, then gcd(y1, . . . , yk) de-
notes their greatest common divisor: that is, the largest
positive integer x such that x | yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Du-
ally, lcm(y1, . . . , yk) denotes the least common multiple
of the yi: that is, the smallest positive integer x such that
yi | x for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Two concepts from elementary number theory will be
essential throughout this letter. In the following
N =
k∏
i=1
peii ,
where the pi are distinct primes. The first important
concept is the Euler φ function,
φ(N) =
k∏
i=1
pei−1i (pi − 1), (1)
which gives the number of integers x in [1, N ] such that
gcd(x,N) = 1. The second is the Carmichael λ func-
tion, λ(N), defined as the smallest integer such that
xλ(N) mod N = 1 for every x satisfying gcd(x,N) = 1.
It follows that if r is the order of some a modulo N , then
r | λ(N). Carmichael’s theorem shows that if N factors
as above, then
λ(N) = lcm(λ(pe11 ), . . . , λ(p
ek
k )) , (2)
where
λ(peii ) = φ(p
ei
i ) for odd primes pi, (3)
λ(2ei ) =
1
2
φ(2ei) = 2ei−2 for ei > 2, (4)
and λ(21) = 1, λ(22) = 2.
III. FACTORING SAFE SEMIPRIMES
A semiprime is a product of two primes, hence finding
any nontrivial factor of a semiprime amounts to find-
ing its complete prime factorization. An odd prime p is
called safe if (p − 1)/2 is also prime (note that p − 1 is
always divisible by 2 when p is odd, so p being safe can
be understood to mean that p − 1 is “as close to prime
as possible”). A safe semiprime is a product of two safe
primes.
A. Semiprimes and Euler’s φ function
If N = p1p2 is a semiprime [22] (including—but not
restricted to—the case of safe semiprimes), then knowing
φ(N) is sufficient for finding a factor of N . Indeed, the
factors can be found immediately and deterministically.
In this case φ(N) = N+1− (p1+p2) which, when solved
simultaneously with N = p1p2, gives a factor. Explicitly,
expanding the product (X − p1)(X − p2) shows that p1
and p2 are the solutions of the quadratic equation
X2 − (N − φ(N) + 1)X +N = 0 . (5)
For general N =
∏k
i=1 p
ei
i , Miller [23] has shown that
knowing both N and φ(N) lets us efficiently factor N
probabilistically, or deterministically under the extended
Riemann hypothesis.
3TABLE I: The possible multiplicative orders for integers mod-
ulo safe semiprimes N = p1p2 (where pi = 2qi + 1 with
p1, p2, q1, and q2 all prime). The number of integers is de-
duced from the isomorphism between the multiplicative group
(Z/nZ)×and the product of cyclic groups C2q1 ×C2q2 .
r
Number of integers
Restrictions on a
1 ≤ a < N of order r
1 1 a = 1
2 3
a = N − 1 and two
other a ≥ √N + 1 > 2
q1 q1 − 1 a 6= 2
q2 q2 − 1 a 6= 2
2q1 3(q1 − 1) a 6= 2
2q2 3(q2 − 1) a 6= 2
q1q2 (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
2q1q2 3(q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
B. Shor’s factoring algorithm for safe semiprimes
Let N = p1p2 be a safe semiprime, so p1 = 2q1+1 and
p2 = 2q2 + 1 with q1 and q2 both prime. SFA chooses a
random residue a modulo N and attempts to compute its
order r using a call to QOFA. SFA iterates this process
until r is even and ar/2 is not congruent to −1 modulo
N ; if r = ordN (a), then gcd(a
r/2 − 1, N) yields a factor
of N (either p1 or p2).
We have φ(N) = 4q1q2 and λ(N) = 2q1q2. As noted
above, if r is the order of some a modulo N , then r |
λ(N); so r must be one of the eight divisors of 2q1q2.
Their frequencies are listed in Table I.
Despite its name, QOFA does not always return the
order of a modulo N . In practice, the quantum Fourier
transform (QFT) in QOFA yields an approximation of
the fraction t/ ordN (a) for some integer t uniformly ran-
domly chosen from {1, . . . , ordN (a)} [3]. The quality of
this approximation depends on the implementation of the
QFT: the output is always a bit granular and blurred,
depending on the number of qubits [2, 3, 20]; circuits
approximating the QFT are available to save resources
at the expense of precision [24–26]. In all theses cases;
the exact value of the output of an ideal QFT can be
found with high probability by trying values neighboring
close to the output [2, 20]. As our primary theoretical
concern is independent of this implementation-dependent
consideration, we simplify our theoretical analysis by as-
suming the implementation to actually give us t/ ordN (a)
exactly. QOFA then uses a continued fraction expansion
to get d = ordN (a)/ gcd(t, ordN (a)). The probability
that this is the true order depends visibly on the number
of nontrivial divisors of ordN (a).
We can use Table I to prove that if N is a safe semi-
prime and we sample a uniformly at random, then each
iteration of SFA yields a factor of N with probability
≤ 1/2. The probability would be exactly 1/2 if QOFA
were a perfect order finding algorithm: looking at Table I,
we see that for a given a we have P (r is even) = 3/4, but
then P (ar/2 6≡ −1 (mod N)) = 2/3; so the probability
that a uniformly randomly chosen a yields a factor is
3/4 ·2/3 = 1/2. Taking QOFA imperfection into account
(that is, the fact that QOFA sometimes returns a proper
divisor of ordN (a)) decreases this probability. It follows
that if N is a safe semiprime, then the expected number
of iterations of SFA—and hence the expected number of
calls to QOFA—is ≥ 2. When a = 2 is fixed and the
safe semiprime is chosen randomly, SFA is conjectured
to succeed with probability 12 . A numerical investigation
of all the 960,392,564 safe primes pi ≤ 1012 indeed gives
success probability 12 − 2.06× 10−10.
C. Factoring safe semiprimes with one call to
QOFA
We propose a change in the classical part of SFA.
This leads to a new, simple quantum factoring algorithm
which almost always succeeds in factoring a safe semi-
prime N = p1p2 = (2q1 + 1)(2q2 + 1) with exactly one
call to QOFA.
The algorithm is given in pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
It is based on Lemma 1 which shows that the only two
possible values for ordN (2) are q1q2 and 2q1q2, and that
QOFA returns a useful factor of ordN (2) with extremely
high probability.
Lemma 1. Let N = p1p2 = (2q1 + 1)(2q2 + 1) be a safe
semiprime, with q1 6= q2 and q1, q2 > 2 (so in particular,
p1 and p2 are distinct safe primes greater than 3). Then
1. ordN (2) is either q1q2 or 2q1q2.
2. QOFA yields d ∈ {q1, q2, q1q2, 2q1, 2q2, 2q1q2} with
probability 1− 1q1q2 ∼ 1− 4N ; otherwise, d ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Referring to Table I, we know that there are only
eight possibilities for the order of an integer modulo N :
namely, the four odd values 1, q1, q2, and q1q2, and the
four even values 2, 2q1, 2q2, and 2q1q2. But ordN (2)
can never be 1 or 2, since N > 3. Now, note that
ordN (2) = lcm(ordp1(2), ordp2(2)) (since p1 6= p2) and
ordpi(2) | λ(pi) = 2qi. Hence, ordN (2) cannot be q1,
q2, 2q1, or 2q2, since otherwise ordp2(2) would in {1, 2},
which contradicts p2 > 5. The only remaining possibili-
ties for ordN (2) are q1q2 and 2q1q2, which proves the first
statement.
For the second statement, recall that QOFA returns
ordN (2)/ gcd(t, ordN (2)) for some uniformly randomly
distributed integer t in {1, . . . , ordN (2)}. But we have
just seen that the value of ordN (2) can only be q1q2 or
2q1q2. If ordN (2) = q1q2 then QOFA only returns 1 if
t = q1q2, which occurs with probability 1/(q1q2); it can-
not return 2. If ordN (2) = 2q1q2 then QOFA returns 1
if t = 2q1q2 and 2 if t = q1q2; the probability of t taking
4one of these two values is 2/(2q1q2) = 1/(q1q2). Hence,
regardless of the true value of ordN (2), the probability of
having a “bad” t leading to a result of 1 or 2 is 1/(q1q2),
which tends to 4/N for large N .
Let d be the result of QOFA applied to 2 modulo N .
Our algorithm then attempts to recover the factors of
N from d. The cases of odd and even d are virtually
identical, and we can unify them by setting s = d if d
is even, and s = 2d if d is odd; then s = 2, 2q1, 2q2,
or 2q1q2. The case s = 2 is trivial to recognise, and
we can determine whether s = 2q1q2 or one of the 2qi
using the elementary inequality 2q1, 2q2 < N/3 < 2q1q2.
If s is one of the 2qi then s + 1 is one of the pi (and
N/(s + 1) is the other). If s is 2q1q2 then we recover
p1 and p2 by using φ(N) = 2s in Eq. 5 and applying
the quadratic formula: the factors of N are t±√t2 −N ,
where t = (N + 1)/2− s. In the unlikely event that s =
2 (probability ∼ 4/N , according to Lemma 1, which is
negligible even for moderate N) then we fail to factor N .
Compared to SFA, the advantages of our algorithm are:
1. It requires only one call to QOFA.
2. It only ever computes the order of 2 modulo N ,
rather than randomly (or specially) chosen 1 < a <
N ; this may be helpful when implementing QOFA,
since multiplication by 2 is a simple bitshift.
3. The probability of failure decreases exponentially
with the length (in bits) of N .
4. In the unlikely event of failure, then we can at-
tempt to factor N by simply running exactly the
same algorithm again. In contrast to SFA, rather
than changing the base, we can repeat with the
convenient a = 2.
In particular, our algorithm is never slower than SFA.
Indeed, the only way that SFA can beat it is to never
call QOFA, which means the very first randomly chosen a
must be a factor of N ; but this is extremely improbable
for even moderate-sized N .
Our algorithm and its analysis imply that safe
semiprimes, (which are considered the hardest inputs for
classical factoring algorithms) are among the easiest in-
puts for quantum factoring algorithms.
IV. REMARKS ON FACTORING OTHER
INTEGERS
A. The restriction of Algorithm 1 to safe
semiprimes
Algorithm 1 only works for safe semiprimes: indeed,
its correctness depends on the extremely small number
of divisors of λ(N) when N is a safe semiprime. It does
not generalize to more general odd composites N , nor
Algorithm 1 Given a safe semiprime N = p1p2, where
p1 = 2q1 + 1 and p2 = 2q2 + 1 with p1, p2, q1, and q2 all
distinct primes, returns {p1, p2} or Failure
1: function FactorSafeSemiprime(N)
2: if 5 | N then return {5, N/5}
3: d← Qofa(2, N)
4: if 2 | d then s← d
5: else s← 2d
6: if s = 2 then return Failure ⊲ Prob. 1/(q1q2)
7: if s < N/3 then p← s+ 1 ⊲ s = 2q1 or 2q2
8: else ⊲ s = 2q1q2
9: t← (N + 1)/2− s
10: p← t+√t2 −N
11: return {p,N/p}
even to products of two primes where only one prime is
safe, without further information on the factors of N .
For example, suppose N = p1p2 where p1 = 2q1 + 1
with q1 prime and p2 = 2q2q
′
2 + 1 where q2 and q
′
2 are
prime (that is, p1 is safe and p2 is “almost safe”). Then
λ(N) = 2q1q2q
′
2, which has sixteen divisors, so there are
sixteen possible orders for integers modulo N . Suppose
QOFA returns the correct order r of 2 (or of any other a)
modulo N . The most common element order is 2q1q2q
′
2;
but this value of r does not immediately yield factors of
N . If r = q1, then (2r+1) is a factor ofN ; but if r = q2 or
q′2, then we generally cannot derive a factor from r. The
problem is that we cannot distinguish between the cases
r = q1, q2, and q
′
2 without further information (such as
the relative sizes of the pi or qi).
The situation degenerates further as the number of
prime factors of λ(N) increases, and indeed as the num-
ber of prime factors pi of N increases. Similarly, the
accuracy of QOFA as an order-finding routine is reduced
(increasing the expected runtime of SFA) when λ(N) has
a more complicated factorization.
B. Simple improvements to SFA for general
integers
For general integers N , therefore, we return to SFA.
We note, however, that the expected number of calls to
QOFA in SFA for general integers N can be reduced with
two simple modifications. First, once the putative or-
der r of a modulo N is calculated, we can easily compute
gcd(r,N), which, if not 1, is a nontrivial factor of N . We
note that this happens very often for N with a square
factor (though it never happens for any RSA modulus).
Second, rather than restricting our search to even r,
we could check whether r is a multiple of a small prime ℓ
(for example, ℓ in {2, 3, 5}); if ar/ℓ is not 1 modulo all of
the factors of N , then it leads to a nontrivial factor of N .
This essentially amounts to trial division of r.
These tricks, while unlikely to reveal the factors, are far
less computationally expensive than rerunning QOFA.
They may be worth trying when an iteration of SFA
5has not found the factors, before recalling QOFA. Sim-
ulating SFA for composite numbers N in [10, 108] shows
that these cheap improvements reduce the proportion
of such N that escape factoring after a single correct
call to QOFA with a = 2 by a factor of 4 (from 6%
to 1.5%). For 60% of the remaining failures, we obtain
ordN (2) = 2
−kλ(N), from which we can find λ(N) and
then factor N using Miller’s algorithm [23]. This gives a
global efficiency gain over SFA of an order of magnitude.
V. CONCLUSION
Changing the classical part of SFA without changing
its quantum part, we have proposed a new algorithm
factoring safe semiprimes, numbers used in cryptogra-
phy. With high probability, our algorithm finds the fac-
tors from just one call to QOFA, and always outperforms
SFA. This offers an improvement in terms of complexity
on SFA, which fails to find the factors from each call to
QOFA with probability 50%, but it also brings practical
benefits. First, since each instance of QOFA requires a
complicated physical experiment, the potential savings
in runtime are large—much larger than that suggested
by the improvement in computational complexity. Some
architectures have particularly large overheads, as each
call to QOFA requires the construction of a new circuit.
The second benefit is that we can fix the value of a,
rather than picking it at random as in SFA. We chose a =
2 because it slightly increases the success probability, but
this improvement is marginal and other sensible choices
exist; experimentalists may even wish to tailor a value to
the circuit they are building.
Finally, in the unlikely event that our algorithm fails,
the factors can usually be found by rerunning the exact
same quantum circuit, saving time in the lab.
Interestingly, safe semiprimes—which were used in
classical encryption precisely because they were believed
to be hard to factor—are the easiest numbers to factor
with a quantum computer. Two forces push in the same
direction: the order is very likely to give λ(N) (from
which the factors are easily found); and QOFA performs
well when given a safe semiprime, returning the order
more often than when acting on a general number.
As we move away from this class to weaker semiprimes
our algorithm becomes inefficient, and we revert to SFA,
boosted by two improvements. We note that even classi-
cal techniques that are unlikely to work can save time if
they avoid rerunning QOFA.
Much work has been done on improving the quantum
part of SFA. We have shown that improving the classical
routines, using simple classical mathematics, can speed
up quantum factoring by reducing the dependence on the
quantum circuit. Our intuition is that this is a promising
path, which will yield more improvements in efficiency.
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